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ABSTRACT. Much analysis on Asian strategic challenges facing the U.S. has jus- 
tifiably emphasized the South China Sea (SCS). This has also been reflected in 2016 
presidential campaign debate on the SCS as an emerging area of U.S. foreign and 
national security policy concern. The East China Sea (ECS) is at least as important 
for the strategic interests of the U.S. and its allies given the tension between China 
and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, potential energy resources in this body 
of water, increasing defense spending by adjacent geographic powers, the area’s 
importance as a maritime international trade route, and the possibility that commu- 
nication failures and miscalculation by interested powers could result in military 
conflict. This work will examine the historical background of this conflict, interna- 
tional legal issues and claims, public opinion within China and Japan, the response 
of U.S. presidential administrations to this conflict, and how the U.S. Congress has 
examined it and sought to influence U.S. diplomatic and military responses to this 
event, and includes recommendations for U.S. and allied military action against 
China if war occurs. It concludes by making recommendations for the U.S. to main- 
tain candid communications with China, support its strategic interests and those of 
our allies against Chinese assertiveness, and how to justify an assertive geopolitical 
stance to domestic and international opinion. 
 
Keywords: geopolitics; East China Sea; Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; China; Japan; 
                   United States; U.S. Congress; Air Defense Identification Zone;  
                   Western Pacific Ocean; military preparedness 
 
 
How to cite: Chapman, Bert (2017), “Geopolitical Implications of the Sino-Japanese East 
China Sea Dispute for the U.S.,” Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 9(2): 
15–54.   
 
Received 18 May 2016 • Received in revised form 21 June 2016 





Much attention has been given to the (SCS) as a potential source of inter- 
national conflict due to its potentially large mineral resources, its location 
adjacent to significant international trade routes like the Straits of Malacca, 
and China’s aggressively claiming portions of this body of water by building 
and weaponizing islands in the SCS.1 The (ECS) is of comparable interna- 
tional economic, political, and strategic significance to the SCS because 
activities in its waters and airspace affect the U.S., China, Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan while serving must be a key focal point of the U.S. Joint 
Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAMGC) which 
must be augmented with requisite funding, force augmentation, equipment, 
and strategic doctrine. Such concrete support is critical if the U.S. and its 
allies must engage and triumph in a military conflict with China.2   
     The (ECS) is an economically and strategically important body of water 
in the Western Pacific Ocean. With maritime geospatial coverage consisting 
of approximately 482,000 square miles, it is bordered by the Yellow Sea to 
the north, the SCS and Taiwan to the south, Japan’s Ryukyu and Kyushu 
islands to the east, and China’s mainland to the west including the major city 
of Shanghai.  China, Japan, Taiwan, and the U.S. all have acute geopolitical 
interests in these waters which are currently administered by Japan. Terri- 
tories of particular concern are a series of islands called the Senkaku Islands 
by Japan, Diaoyu Islands by China, and Diaoyutai Islands by Taiwan which 
are part of the Ryukyu island chain administered by Japan. These eight 
uninhabited islands (the largest being two miles long and less than a mile 
wide) are barren, but sovereignty over them is a matter of acute geopolitical 
contention between these countries under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
     The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates the ECS 
contains nearly 200 million barrels of oil in proven and probable reserves 
and 1–2 trillion cubic feet of proved and probable natural gas reserves. If 
estimates of these oil reserves are true and they can be extracted, China 
would no longer have to import them from the Persian Gulf region or SCS 
consequently diminishing the chances of its energy supply lines to potential 
disruption. Tides in this region during December 2015 ranged from -0.1 feet 
to 6.6 feet indicating an area affected by monsoonal winds, typhoons, strong 
storms, and local winds, and a growing population which can significantly 
influence regional aviation, meteorological, and shipping activity.3 
     During 2013 trade between China and Japan was $182.11 billion and trade 
between Japan and China was $129.88 billion, trade between China, Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and the U.S. which is primarily seaborne and can 
cross through the ECS in 2015 was $598.1 billion between China and the 
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U.S., $193.6 billion between Japan and the U.S., $115.3 billion between 
South Korea and the U.S., and $66.6 billion between Taiwan and the U.S. 
representing a cumulative total of $973.6 billion and 35.1% of U.S. interna- 
tional trade in 2015 with these four countries being among the top 9 U.S. 
trading partners. Besides ports in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in prox- 
imity to the ECS, major Chinese ports whose merchandise is carried from 
locations adjacent to the ECS though the ECS to global markets include 
Dalian, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shanghai, Shenzen, 
and Tianjin which currently rank among eight of the world’s 14 busiest ports 
in container rankings according to the World Shipping Council.4 
 
Figure 1 East China Sea Region 
 




Both China and Japan have significant historical claims to ownership of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Beijing claims that the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) 
regarded the islands as part of its maritime territory and included them on 
maps. China also claims the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) placed these islands 
under Taiwan’s jurisdiction. However, while Chinese fishermen may have 
used the islands for temporary sanctuary, China never established permanent 
civilian or military settlement on the islands and permanent naval forces did 
not patrol adjacent waters.5 
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     Japan contends there is no territorial dispute to these islands and maintains 
it claimed them in January 1895 when the Japanese Emperor Meiji approved 
an ordinance annexing them. Tokyo argues that the islands were uninhabited 
and there was no evidence that China ever controlled them which China and 
Taiwan reject. The May 1895 Shimonoseki Treaty ended the 1894–1895 
Sino-Japanese War and saw China cede Taiwan and related islands to Japan 
although the treaty does not mention these islands which were not discussed 
during the negotiating sessions.6 
     Japan retained control over these islands through World War II when it 
relinquished authority over Taiwan in October 1945 without mentioning the 
disposition of these islands. The U.S. began administering the Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands in 1953 as a result of the 1951 peace treaty with Japan which 
did not mention these islands, but alluded to other islands reverting to 
Chinese control or claimed by China. Article 3 of this treaty gave the U.S. 
sole powers of administration of Nansei Shoto south of 29⁰ north latitude 
which includes these islands.7 
     The U.S. administered Nansei Shoto and other Ryukyu Islands until they 
were returned to Japan under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty which was signed 
on June 17, 1971 and entered into force on May 15, 1972. The period lead- 
ing up to this agreement saw the 1968 publication of a report by the United 
Nations Committee for the Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral 
Resources in Asian Offshore Areas maintaining that there could be significant 
energy deposits under the ECS. The potential presence of such deposits 
attracted acute interest from China, Japan, and Taiwan and has heavily 
influenced their subsequent interest in these waters.8    
     Increasing military expenditures by adjacent countries, numerous incidents 
involving China and Japan in these waters, and growing pressure on the U.S. 
to maintain international freedom of navigation and air space in the region, 
have heightened the ECS’ influence as an emerging international crisis region 
with some analysts observing that pre-World War I strategic historical 
analogies correctly describe this region. Other analysts stress the greater like- 
lihood of its emergence as a future international region of crisis and potential 
conflict. Divergent perspectives also exist on the appropriateness of the pre-
World War II Munich appeasement analogy to China’s strategic rise and 
military assertiveness.9  
 
U.S. Presidential Administration Reactions 
 
The U.S. has not taken an official position on Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwan- 
ese claims to these islands. In written testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on October 20, 1971, State Department Acting Assistant 
Legal Adviser Robert Starr maintained that returning administrative rights to 
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Japan did not prejudice legal claims by other countries and that the U.S. 
regards conflicting claims to these islands as a matter to be resolved by the 
countries directly concerned.10 
     However, this rhetorical diplomatic nuancing stands in contrast to the 1960 
U.S. Japan Security Treaty whose Article 5 implicitly contains language say- 
ing that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are part of Okinawa and that the U.S. is 
responsible for their defense. This was reaffirmed by Secretary of State Will- 
iam Rogers and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard in congressional 
testimony on the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.11 Subsequent U.S. presidential 
administrations have reaffirmed that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are covered 
by the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty as demonstrated by Assistant Secretary of 
State Richard Armitage on February 2, 2004, during remarks in Tokyo;12 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on October 30, 2010, in Hanoi;13 and by 
President Barack Obama during an April 24, 2014, Tokyo press conference 
with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.14 
     This U.S. commitment was further documented in U.S.–Japan Defense 
Cooperation guidelines on April 27, 2015 stressing that the U.S.–Japan 
Security Treaty and U.S.–Japanese alliance fundamentals are unchanged.  
These guidelines stressed that Japan has primary responsibility for its national 
defense; that both governments will share and protect information and intel- 
ligence while maintaining common situational awareness against potential 
threats to the ECS; that U.S. and Japanese defense forces will maintain and 
strengthen deterrence and defense against ballistic missile launches, aerial 
incursions, and maritime threats; and coordinate responses to military attacks 
against Japan across the combat spectrum.15 
 
Figure 2 Uotsuri Island in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
 






  Figure 3 Detailed Map of  
                  Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
 
  Source:  Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
International Legal Issues 
 
Numerous international legal issues affect the ECS and the concerns of ad- 
joining countries including China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.  Besides 
disputing over the territorial sovereignty of the Senkayu/Diaoyu Islands, 
Beijing, and Tokyo disagree over ECS maritime boundaries. China claims 
the entire continental shelf to the Okinawa Trough while Japan claims the 
same shelf to a median line between its undisputed territory and Chinese 
territory. Beginning in the 1970s, China has been exploring and building 
pipelines on and around its side of the median line in disputed waters con- 
taining oil and gas deposits. During the 2000s, both countries began pursuing 
a bilateral agreement over exploiting undersea hydrocarbon resources.16 
     Skepticism over the utility of international law to Chinese and Japanese 
claims over these islands has been expressed because the United Nations 
Commission on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) general rules fail to easily 
accommodate the ECS’ unique geography, international customary law on 
territorial acquisition  encourages the “display of sovereignty” and penalizes 
states appearing to acquiesce to a rival’s territorial claims, the vagueness of 
customary international law encourages parties to advocate international legal 
norms benefitting their national interests, and both China and Japan have 
hesitated to have their claims adjudicated by an international legal body for 
fear of an adverse ruling which could produce negative domestic political 
repercussions. Although a 2008 law review analysis maintained Japan’s claim 
might be stronger if submitted to International Court of Justice arbitration, 
enough uncertainty remains to prevent either Beijing or Tokyo from engaging 
in such action.17 
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     In June 2008, both countries reached agreement on jointly exploring for 
gas and oil in two of the fields (Chunxiao/Shirabaka) close to or straddling 
the median line Japan claims as the rightful boundary between China and 
Japan’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). These are defined by 
(UNCLOS) as area extending from a country’s coastline up to 200 nautical 
miles from the edge of a country’s territorial sea which ends 12 miles from 
its coastline. The Sino-Japanese joint development states it does not prejudice 
either side’s legal claims in the region.18  
     However, the cooperative atmosphere of the 2008 mineral resources 
development agreement was set aside by China’s November 23, 2013 decision 
to establish an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the ECS. 
 
  Figure 4 Air Defense Identification Zones in East Asia 
 
  Source: Congressional Research Service 
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ADIZ’s, as this map indicates, have been established by surrounding regional 
countries. An ADIZ consists of airspace beyond a country’s sovereign ter- 
ritory in which a country requires identifying, locating, and air traffic control 
of aircraft flying in this airspace due to national security concerns. No inter- 
national law governs ADIZs, although various legal standards such as freedom 
of navigation remain. Beijing did not consult with the U.S. and other 
affected countries about this decision which implied that China would use 
force against aircraft failing to follow its ADIZ guidelines. Probable reasons 
for Beijing declaring this ADIZ include challenging Japanese administration 
of ECS islands, bolstering China’s claims to these islands, and protesting 
U.S. military surveillance activities in this area.   
     The U.S. criticized China’s declaration as destabilizing and increasing 
regional conflict risks, announced that it did not accept the ADIZ, and the U.S. 
military continued flying its aircraft through the ADIZ without notifying 
China or responding to Chinese requests for identification. However, the 
Federal Aviation Administration distributed Chinese requirements for flying 
in this ADIZ to commercial airlines as part of its Notices to Airmen 
(NOTAM) announcements. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan oppose the 
Chinese ADIZ, which overlaps their existing ADIZs, and continue existing 
military practices in the ADIZ.19  
     China may have intercepted some Japanese military aircraft in this ADIZ 
in 2014. This ADIZ has not appeared to disrupt commercial aircraft traffic, 
but on July 25, 2015, Beijing turned back Lao Airlines flight QV916 travel- 
ing from South Korea to Laos as it entered the ECS ADIZ with China claim- 
ing this happened due to noncompliance with its ADIZ regulations.20 
Japanese air scrambles to intercept Chinese aerial intrusions into Japanese 
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China opposes using median lines to delineate maritime boundaries and seeks 
to use its sovereignty claims in the SCS by applying them to the ECS to keep 
potential opponents at long range from its coast, intimidate them with its 
military power, and create a Mare Nostrum (our sea) perception of adjacent 
waters. China also objects to U.S. military activities in the ECS which have 
produced incidents in 2001 and 2009, even though UNCLOS’ Article 58 is 
intended to preserve the right of states to conduct military operations in 
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EEZs. Since Beijing has designated the waters from Japan’s Southwest 
Islands to Taiwan as its First Island chain and the route from the Bonin 
Islands to Mariana, Guam, and Palau as its Second Island Chain, potential 
Sino-Japanese conflict over these regions is not likely to be resolved easily 
and will affect the U.S. due to Guam being a U.S. territory with significant 
military bases and extensive regional U.S. strategic interests. Washington 
plans to place military training facilities on Pagan and Tinian in the Northern 
Marianas which is a U.S. Commonwealth. The U.S. also has a long-standing 
commitment to international freedom of navigation (FON) and regularly crit- 
icizes China for restricting FON in the ECS and elsewhere through excessive 
straight line baselines; falsely claiming jurisdiction of EEZ airspace; restrict- 
ing foreign aircraft flying through an ADIZ without intending to enter national 
airspace; and domestic law criminalizing surveying activity by foreign entities 
within an EEZ.22 
 
Regional Defense Spending 
 
This topic’s geopolitical importance is further magnified by increasing defense 
spending by regionally adjacent ECS powers, the area’s important to inter- 
national trade routes, and its proximity to vital U.S. interests including main- 
taining alliances with Japan and South Korea and the imperative for the U.S. 
to have unfettered access to these waters to defend its ties with these coun- 
tries and prevent hegemonic aspirations by China. According to the Inter- 
national Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), China accounts for 19.8% of 
global defense spending increases with other Asian countries accounting for 
9.4% of these increases. Its defense spending increased from $131 billion in 
2014 to $146 billion in 2015. Beijing’s active duty military personnel numbers 
2,333,000, its naval cruisers, destroyers, and frigates number 73; its tactical 
aircraft number 1,866, and its attack/guided missile submarines number 56 
far ahead of both South Korea and Japan.23 
     China, Japan, and South Korea account for nearly 62% of Asian defense 
spending with Chinese spending representing 41% of region’s overall expen- 
ditures. China’s 2015 defense white paper stresses the rhetoric of a “Chinese 
Dream” to enhance China’s military strength. Other characteristics of this 
document include safeguarding China’s security and interests in new domains; 
safeguarding national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests; 
seizing the strategic initiative in military struggle; and shifting the PLAN 
and PLAAF emphasis from offshore waters and territorial airspace defense 
to open seas protection, building a combined multifunctional and efficient 
marine combat force structure, incorporating offensive capabilities into air 
operations, building an air-space defense force capable of operating in highly 
informatized operations, and boosting strategic early warning, air strike, air 
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and missile defense, information countermeasures, information operations, 
and strategic protection and combat support capabilities.24 
     During 2015, Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) requested a 2.2% budget 
increase in 2015 marking the fourth straight year of consecutive defense 
budget increases. New government guidelines were implemented allowing 
Tokyo greater latitude to use force to defend the U.S. even if Japan is not 
directly attacked but believes its own security is endangered. These guide- 
lines enable Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to protect U.S. 
shipping, intercept ballistic missiles, and provide logistical support if war 
occurs.25 
    A 2013 Japanese MOD planning document stressed the growing threat of 
North Korean military provocations such as ballistic missile tests and empha- 
sizing increasing Chinese maritime military assertiveness including intrusions 
into Japanese territorial waters and airspace and establishing an ADIZ. This 
document recommended responding to these developments by enhancing 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources, strengthening and 
expanding the U.S. alliance by joint training exercises, realigning U.S. force 
structure in Japan, defeating attacks on remote islands by securing air and 
maritime superiority through military interdiction, and effectively responding 
to ballistic missile and cyber attacks through multi-layered defenses.26  
     Specific quantitative enhancements to Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) 
proposed in this document included increasing the number of destroyers from 
47–54; submarines from 16–22; and fighter planes from 260–280.27 Japan 
possesses extensive underwater, shore-based, and airborne maritime surveil- 
lance capabilities. These include undersea hydrophone arrays connected to 
shore stations with electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems for monitoring, 
identifying, and tracking submarine and surface traffic in Tokyo’s internal 
straits and surrounding seas. Some of these assets are operated jointly with 
the U.S. Navy and are critically important to the U.S. These submarine 
detection assets could prove decisive in any submarine confrontation, but have 
vulnerable facilities making them attractive targets to Beijing in a conflict.  
Their presence produces the possibility of escalation involving U.S. forces 












Figure 5 Japan’s Yonaguni Island Radar-80 Miles South  
                of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
 
Source: Maritime Executive 
  
Significant attention and financial resources are devoted to remote island 
defense in Japan’s FY 2016 defense budget as reflected in this statement:  
“In order to respond to attacks on remote islands, the MOD will develop 
continuous surveillance capabilities, ensure and maintain air superiority and 
maritime supremacy, enhance rapid deployment and response capabilities 
such as transportation and amphibious operation capabilities, and strengthen 
the infrastructure for C3I capabilities.” Specific programmatic activities in- 
volved in these aspirations include: 
 Developing coastal observation facilities on Yonaguni Island. 
 Deploying mobile warning and control radar in Amani-Oshima. 
 Conducting studies to determine desirable air defense posture in remote 
Pacific Islands. 
 Acquiring 6 F-35A Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. 
 Shifting fighter posture squadrons to develop readiness for air superiority. 
 Ensuring and maintaining maritime supremacy by fixed wing aircraft, an 
Aegis equipped destroyer, and a maritime operations center; and 
 Strengthening command, control, communications, and intelligence capa- 
bilities in the ECS.29 
 
Chinese and Japanese Public Opinion 
 
This topic has garnered significant interest in Chinese and Japanese public 
opinion and in scholarly literature on the ECS. A search of the Chinese 
National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database revealed just six entries 
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on the ECS in 2005 and eight entries on this subject in 2006. Scholarly 
interest in this topic significantly increased between 2011 and 2015 with the 
number of entries on this topic significantly increasing between 2011 and 








A search of this database for entries on the Diaoyu Islands revealed six 
entries in 2005 and eight entries in 2006. A comparable spike in CNKI 
entries on this topic is reflected in the following table for 2011–2014 along 








Recent decades have seen periodic incidents between Japan and China in the 
ECS which have attracted public attention and international reaction. In 
March and April 1978, members of Japan’s Diet (Parliament) opposed to a 
Peace and Friendship Treaty with China raised the matter of these islands 
and the nationalist Japanese Youth Federation (JYF) built a lighthouse on the 
largest of these islands symbolizing Tokyo’s claims. China responded by 
deploying a flotilla of more than eighty armed fishing boats circling the items 
but the desire of a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commander to 
conduct a major exercise was overruled by Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping.32 
     A 1990 dispute over these islands was influenced by Beijing’s 1989 
Tiananmen Square crackdown and the desire of Chinese leaders to show their 
strength at a time of international sanctions against China following this event.  
This was reflected in commemorations of the 150th anniversary of the Opium 
War and a museum exhibit in Beijing recognizing Chinese resistance to 
Japanese aggression between 1937 and 1945. The dispute began when Jap- 
anese media reported on September 29, 1990, that Japan’s Maritime Safety 
Agency (JMSA) was preparing to recognize the 1978 lighthouse as an 
“official navigation mark which the JYF had repaired in 1988–1989 to meet 
the technical standards necessary for official recognition. Taiwan made a 
written protest to Japan and China’s Foreign Ministry condemned recognition 
of the lighthouse on October 18, 1990, as violating Chinese sovereignty and 
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demanding Tokyo curtail nationalistic organization activities. Japan’s Foreign 
Ministry reaffirmed Japan’s claim to the islands. 
     On October 21, 1990, the JMSA repelled two boats of Taiwanese activists 
seeking to put a torch on the islands to symbolize Taipei’s sovereignty.  
China’s Foreign Ministry denounced Japan’s actions and anti-Japanese 
demonstrations occurred in Hong Kong and newspaper articles excoriated 
“Japanese militarism.” Taiwan held an emergency cabinet meeting, issued a 
statement protesting Tokyo’s actions and reaffirming Taipei’s sovereignty, and 
urged for the issue to be resolved diplomatically. Although Beijing’s govern- 
ment was relatively quiet about this, students in Beijing heard about this 
incident through British Broadcasting Corporation and Voice of America 
broadcasts and protested the Japanese actions complaining about their own 
government’s restrained response.33 
     In 1992 China’s National Peoples Congress enacted a “Law on the Terri- 
torial Sea and Contiguous Zone.” This statute held expansive aspirations 
toward Beijing’s ownership of adjoining land territory and territorial waters 
with Article 2 asserting: “The territorial sea of the People’s Republic of 
China is the sea belt adjacent to the land territory and the internal waters of 
the People’s Republic of China. The land territory of the People’s Republic 
of China includes the mainland of the People’s Republic of China and its 
coastal islands; Taiwan and all islands appertaining thereto including the 
Diaoyu Islands; the Penghu Islands; the Dongsha Islands; the Xisha Islands; 
the Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha Islands; as well as all the other islands 
belonging to the People’s Republic of China.”34 
     An additional crisis occurred in July 1996 when the JYF erected a solar 
powered aluminum lighthouse on the islands. A few days later Japan ratified 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and de- 
clared a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone including these islands.  
China had also ratified UNCLOS during this time period reaffirming what it 
saw as its sovereignty over the islands and Japanese national groups 
advocated that Tokyo claim the lighthouse as an official Japanese landmark.  
On July 29, 1996 Japanese Prime Minister Ryūtaro Hashimoto visited the 
controversial Yakasuni Shrine honoring Japanese war dead and on August 18, 
1996, the Senkaku Islands Defense Association put a wooden Japanese flag 
next to one of the lighthouses.35    
     Tensions were exacerbated when Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko 
Ikeda reaffirmed Japan’s claims with a Hong Kong newspaper with Ikeda 
asserting: “The Daioyu Islands have always been Japan’s territory; Japan 
already effectively governs the islands, so the territorial issue does not exist.”  
Following September 9, 1996, JYF repairs of the typhoon damaged light- 
house, China’s Foreign Ministry strongly protested to Japan warning that if 
Tokyo did not take measures to prevent “infringements” on Chinese sover- 
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eignty that this subject would become more serious and complicated. On 
September 13–14, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) practiced blockades 
and landings on islands off Liaoning Province which could be interpreted as 
warnings to Tokyo. Anti-Japanese demonstrations occurred in Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan with Hong Kong protestors presenting the Chinese gov- 
ernment with 15,000 signatures urging a more resolute stand against Japan.  
Sino-Japanese diplomatic meetings over the next few months partially eased 
tensions though acute and lingering displeasure toward Beijing’s perceived 
softness on this issue rankled many in China.36 
     Following a few years of quiescence, contentiousness over these islands 
flared up again during 2004–2005. During January 2004, two Chinese fishing 
vessels working in waters near these islands were attacked by Japanese 
patrol boats. March 2004 saw seven members of the China Federation for 
Defending the Diaoyu Islands land on Uotsori Island. These individuals were 
detained by the Japanese Coast Guard and deported to China two days later.  
Beijing protested Tokyo’s action which was supported by anti-Japanese 
activists who protested outside the Japanese Embassy in Beijing under close 
Chinese police supervision. In November 2004, the Japanese military drafted 
a contingency plan designed to defend remote southern islands off Kyushu 
and Okinawa from potential invasion. 
     In February 2005 Japan announced that the lighthouse built by Japanese 
activists was placed under national control and protection which China de- 
scribed as “a serious provocation and violation of Chinese territory.” This time 
period also saw Japan and the U.S. issue a joint regional security declaration 
stating that peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question was a shared strategic 
issue and in April 2005 Japan began allocating gas exploration rights in 
Chinese-claimed areas. In addition, individuals and organizations such as the 
China Federation to Defend the Diaoyu Islands began using emerging Internet 
social media and cell phones to unleash anti-Japanese protests which reached 
40 Chinese cities, featured attacks on the Japanese Embassy and Japanese 
owned businesses, and were very difficult for Chinese authorities to control. 
     A sign of China’s response to these 2004–2005 developments was estab- 
lishing a naval reserve fleet for ECS use and for deploying naval ships in the 
area to protect territorial sovereignty and signal its increased military resolve 
and assets to both Japan and the U.S. March 2005 saw the initiation of 
diplomatic efforts to ameliorate this dispute with Beijing seeking to partially 
meet protestors’ demands while preventing tensions from escalating out of 
control.37 
     This dispute erupted again on September 7, 2010 when a collision occurred 
between a Chinese fishing trawler and two Japanese Coast Guard ships north 
of one of the disputed islands. As the Chinese boat attempted to flee, Japanese 
Coast Guard personnel boarded the Chinese vessel arresting the crew. Beijing 
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responded by sending a fishery law enforcement team to the region to secure 
fishery protection and the safety and property of Chinese fishermen. Protests 
occurred outside Japanese consulates in various Chinese cities under strict 
police control and on September 11, China postponed scheduled ECS negoti- 
ations with Japan. The crew was eventually released later that month and a 
high-level meeting between Chinese and Japanese leaders in Brussels in 
October helped ease tensions. 
     China initially responded by imposing what proved to be a temporary 
embargo on rare earth minerals to Japan, the United States, and European 
Union. These resources are possessed in near monopolistic abundance by 
China and are critical for civilian use in areas such as clean energy including 
hybrid cars and wind turbines and have military applications including 
weapons systems such as fins steering precision munitions. Any significant 
curtailment of their supply by China could have significant downstream global 
economic and geopolitical repercussions. This brief embargo resulted in 
cerium’s price rising from $5 per kilogram (kg) to $67 per kg, neodymium 
from $42 per kg to $142 per kg and dysprosium from $250 per kg to $400 
per kg.38 
     Further tension between Beijing and Tokyo over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
occurred beginning on September 11, 2012, when the Japanese government 
signed a $26.1 million contract with private businessman Kunioki Kurihara 
to purchase three of these islands: Uotsuri, Kita-Kojima, and Minami-Kojima. 
This move was actually designed to thwart moves by nationalist Tokyo 
Governor Shintaro Isihara to purchase the islands with money collected in a 
national fund-raising campaign. Some segments of Chinese popular opinion 
erupted with thousands of Chinese protesting in eighty-five cities over a one-
week period. These protests produced some violence against Japanese indi- 
viduals and property. Japanese companies in China reported significant losses 
during this period with Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airways reporting that 
over 53,000 seat reservations were cancelled between September-November 
2012 and Japanese automakers experienced a nearly 40% drop in sales. The 
economic impact of these protests lead International Monetary Fund Manag- 
ing Director Christine Lagarde to warn that these protests could negatively 
impact the global economy given China and Japan’s critical roles in interna- 
tional economics.39 
    The 2012 Japanese Defense White Paper noted China’s navy was seeking 
to protect and consolidate ECS maritime interests. This document noted that 
in June 2011 a record 11 PLAN vessels passed between Okinawa and Miyako 
Island into the Pacific Ocean as demonstrations of Beijing’s naval capabilities 
in acquiring, maintaining, and protecting maritime rights and interests.  
These transits appear to represent attempts by Beijing to break through the 
first island chain extending from northern Japan south through the Ryukyu 
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Islands into the SCS and signaling displeasure with Japan. In early October 
2012, China deployed seven warships through the Miyako Strait without 
alerting Tokyo as required by a preexisting agreement.40 
     Japan has responded by stressing protection of its southwestern islands.  
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Japanese Defense Minister 
Satoshi Marimoto said “Japan has 6,800 islands, and territory that stretches 
over 3,300 kilometers [2,000 miles]; it’s necessary to have troops at its south- 
western end to beef up our warning and surveillance capability…. We must 
defend without fail our sovereign rights and our land that includes the 
Senkaku Islands….We must strengthen our overall defense capability in the 
southwest.” Japan has also shifted its defense posture to the west and south- 
west to accommodate North Korea’s increasing threat and China’s increasing 
ECS presence. This has resulted in Japan shifting its defense posture from 
static defense to dynamic defense requiring greater integration between the 
JMSDF, Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF), and Japan Ground Self-
Defense Force (JGSDF) if there is a Chinese attempt to retake the Senkakus 
or other Japanese islands.41 
     Following the aforementioned controversy over China’s November 2013 
announcement of an ADIZ over the ECS, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe visited the controversial Yakasuni shrine. In addition, contentious state- 
ments by Abe and various colleagues about Japan’s World War II activities 
in China have been detrimental to Sino-Japanese relations. Japan has requested 
that China withdraw patrol vessels from the area around these islands.  
However, Beijing has refused and sent maritime enforcement ships into the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial seas 50 times in 2013 and announced 
plans to enhance its maritime presence and “safeguard sovereignty” during 
2014 which was reflected with the following numbers of Chinese patrol 
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China and Japan continue periodic diplomatic talks to keep their island ter- 
ritorial disputes from boiling over. However, both sides face pressure from 
nationalistic elements in their polities to maintain irredentist stands on this 
issue. At the same time there is also sentiment in both countries to avoid 
military confrontation due to the extent of existing economic ties and the high 
costs such a confrontation could produce for both countries domestically and 
internationally. A 2014 public opinion poll covering both countries found 
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that 63.7% of Chinese respondents favored more forceful demonstrations of 
effective control over the Senkaky/Diaoyu Islands but only 22.7% of Japanese 
respondents favor a more assertive response by their country. Additional 
revelations from this poll include 64.8% of Chinese believing this territorial 
dispute is the biggest irritant in these countries bilateral relationship while 
58.6% of Japanese believe the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is the biggest problem 
in their countries relationship. However, Japanese opinion is more pessimistic 
than Chinese opinion that historical bilateral problems between the two 
countries will be resolved regardless of what happens in the present or future 
between these countries. Finally, 70% of Chinese and 80% of Japanese 
expressed concern over deteriorating relations between their countries. An 
August 14, 2015, speech by Abe implied that there would be a bilateral Sino-
Japanese effort to improve relations and stated that Japan had to honestly 
reckon with its past. He also noted that China should not challenge the 
international order and that Japan must balance between an authoritarian and 
revisionist China with one analyst noting that Japanese public opinion and 





As part of its constitutional legislative oversight and funding role, Congress 
has taken episodic interest in the ECS dispute between China and Japan in its 
hearings and legislation. An early example of the ECS being mentioned in a 
congressional committee hearing occurred during a Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee hearing on June 7, 2005. During this hearing Assistant Secretary 
of State for East Asia and the Pacific Christopher Hill mentioned periodic 
grievances over Japan’s wartime legacy erupting in China such as changes in 
Japanese history textbooks erupting in anti-Japanese violence. Hill also 
mentioned that despite greater Sino-Japanese trade integration that recent 
controversies over the Senkaku Islands, ECS energy exploration, China’s 
position on Taiwan, and Beijing’s opposition to Japan’s aspirations for a per- 
manent United Nations Security Council seat have chilled bilateral relations.44 
     A January 13, 2010, House Armed Services Committee hearing saw the 
Navy’s Pacific Command Commander Admiral Robert F. Willard noting 
Chinese vocal assertiveness about how their Sea Lines of Communication 
(SLOC) relate to movement of their commerce, trade, and energy, the stra- 
tegic value of the Straits of Malacca and other choke points between natural 
resource suppliers and Beijing, and how their expanding Air Force and naval 
capacity involves securing regional commercial interests. Willard went on to 
maintain how far this expansion of Chinese power projection capacity into 
the Asia-Pacific region, ECS, SCS, and Indian Ocean becomes remains to be 
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seen. This hearing also saw Rep. Randy Forbes (R-VA) express concern to 
Willard about China having an estimated 260 military ships in the Western 
Pacific as opposed to the U.S. having 180 military ships in these waters.45  
Comparable viewpoints between China and Taiwan on the Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands were reflected during a March 28, 2012, hearing when John 
Tkacik of the International Assessment and Strategy’s Center Future Asia 
Project noted that Taipei’s deep water ports and submarine bases in eastern 
Taiwan have enabled Chinese submarines to slip undetected into the Pacific’s 
deepest maritime trenches and will likely provide a future home to Chinese 
diesel and electric submarines. He also stressed the Senkakus critical impor- 
tance in defining the maritime depth of the East Asia, Japan, and the United 
States opposite an emerging Chinese superpower.46 
     A May 10, 2013, paper prepared for the U.S–China Economic and Security 
Review Commission stressed that China’s Foreign Ministry declared the 
Senkakus/Diaoyus a “core interest” on April 26, 2013. This assessment deter- 
mined that this declaration elevated these islands to the level of Taiwan, Tibet, 
and Xinjiang in Chinese rhetorical national security emphasis which the 
Japanese determine indicates Chinese inflexibility on this matter. However, 
additional Chinese statements on this topic claim that these islands touch on 
core Chinese interests potentially indicating Beijing as being more flexible.47 
     A December 11, 2013, hearing by the Commission on Security Cooper- 
ation in Europe produced some interesting historical analogies to describe 
the ECS strategic situation. National Endowment for Democracy President 
Carl Gersham maintained China’s setting up an ADIZ established a “casus 
belli” with its Japanese and South Korean neighbors and the U.S. for future 
generations and referenced the Economist saying there were disturbing 
parallels between the Northeast Asian situation and the outbreak of World War 
I with the Senkakus playing the role of Sarajevo. Karin J. Lee, the Executive 
Director of the National Committee on North Korea noted that while Sino-
Japanese Senkaku/Diaoyu tension has been high over the last year, the Inter-
Korean maritime dispute over the West Sea’s Northern Limit Line actually 
produced multiple military clashes, that North Korean progress in developing 
nuclear weapons and long-range missiles threatens regional insecurity, and 
that South Korean vows to retaliate against North Korean provocations by 
attacking their supporting forces and command leadership exacerbates 
regional tensions.48 
     A joint January 14, 2014, hearing by the House Armed Services and 
Foreign Affairs Committee saw Rep. Matt Salmon (R-AZ) stress the geo- 
political importance of the ECS region with the following contention:  
 
Over the last several years, we have seen increased aggressions in 
the disputed waters of the South China Sea, and more recently, 
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the East China Sea. As China has sought to expand their control 
of the region, U.S. allies are struggling to ensure their sovereignty 
is maintained and navigational rights to the South and East China 
Sea is protected.  
Military and commercial access to the navigable waters of the 
South and East China Seas are critical to the security and economic 
viability of every country in the region. Strong U.S. allies, includ- 
ing Japan, Taiwan, and Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, have 
come under increasing pressure from China to cede or temper these 
inalienable sovereign rights to the Chinese will. There must be a 
peaceful pass forward to protect the U.S. regional allies that 
ensures U.S. national security interests and avoids unnecessary 
conflict and aggressions.49 
 
Testifying at this hearing, Naval War College Professor Peter Dutton noted 
that ongoing Chinese regional maritime expansion dates back to 1840 when 
China quit dominating the Asian maritime system due to western intervention. 
He also contended that a key aim of Beijing’s maritime strategy is expanding 
interior control over its Near Seas to eventually achieve a level of con- 
tinental control it believes it needs to enhance its security interests. Dutton 
also observed that since December 2008 Chinese activities around the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have sought to cast doubt on Japanese control of 
these islands, are conducted carefully to avoid provoking outright conflict 
with the U.S., and include non-militarized coercion involving direct and 
indirect application of national capabilities to alter the seaborne situation in 
Beijing’s favor. He also maintained that China’s ECS ADIZ is intended to 
control water and airspace approaching these islands to articulate a legally 
legitimizing narrative for controlling these islands.50 
     Witness Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
contended that how Beijing manages these disputes is seen as a litmus test 
for its broader strategic ambitions and how the U.S. responds to China’s 
increasing tendency to use coercion, bullying, and salami-like tactics to 
advance its territorial and maritime interests. Glaser went on stress there is 
high potential for escalation between China and Japan which could embroil 
the U.S. as a result of Washington’s security treaty with Tokyo.51 
     A February 5, 2014, House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on East 
Asian security topics saw Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D-HI) ask Assistant Secretary 
of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel if there could be a mech- 
anism for crisis prevention or management if events in the ECS threatened to 
escalate into a crisis. Russel responded saying that while area governments 
communicate capital to capital, that ships involved in such incidents should 
be able to communicate bridge-to-bridge instead of delegating decisions to 
junior officer in the heat of the moment to develop consistent rules for 
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reaching agreement on resolution mechanisms such as hot lines or standard 
operating procedures.52 
      Russel also responded to a post-hearing question by Rep. Mel Brooks 
(R-AL) on whether the U.S. could take concrete steps to peacefully resolve 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute by reaffirming the U.S. stance of not taking a 
position on sovereignty over these islands. He also stressed that the U.S. 
urges Beijing and Tokyo to prevent incidents, manage disputes peacefully, 
that both countries should establish effective crisis communication channels 
at the highest levels, and follow international law in resolving disputes.53 
     Testifying again on this subject before the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee on March 4, 2014, Russel stressed the administration’s belief that no 
party sought conflict in the ECS, but was concerned that unintended acci- 
dents or incidents could result in tensions escalating. He also emphasized that 
the U.S. wants good relationships between China and its neighbors.  Michael 
Auslin of the American Enterprise Institute stressed that expanded U.S.–
Japanese military exercises such as the recently concluded Iron Fist exercise 
in California involving the Marines and the JGSDF would help enhance 
Japanese military capability and gain credibility in protecting Japan’s south- 
western flanks.54 
During Fall 2014, both the House and Senate passed resolutions (H. Res. 
714 and S. Res. 412) calling for peaceful resolution of maritime jurisdiction 
disputes in the ECS and SCS and reaffirming strong U.S. support for free- 
dom of navigation and other internationally legal uses of Asia-Pacific sea and 
airspace. This resolution cited numerous recent instances of Chinese restric- 
tions on international air and maritime movement in the ECS and SCS.55 
     Testifying before an April 15, 2015, hearing Bryan Clark of the Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, praised China for developing naval 
capability to enhance their maritime services, non-navy Coast Guard, and 
other non-military surveillance services which execute lawfare to implement 
Chinese maritime and territorial claims. Clark also expressed concern that 
the U.S. Navy and its regional allies are incapable of dealing with sub-
conventional aggression by China and that Beijing hopes to use its low-level 
capabilities to gain preeminence in competing for ECS and SCS territories.  
He went on to emphasize that the U.S. and its allies need to alter their air 
defense capabilities by using smaller weapons with shorter range to destroy 
incoming weapons closer to U.S. and allied shipping. Clark also advocated 
that the U.S. and its allies should have ships capable of coercing China in 
coastal waters as Beijing has to Japanese and Philippine ships, that U.S. 
weapons should be smaller and more precise to obtain maximum firepower, 
and that these weapons should be ship carried and airborne.56 
     Recent analyses note Beijing’s regular and ongoing use of coercion by 
the PLAN and Coast Guard to influence and enforce its interpretation of the 
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ECS security environment. Beijing’s claims of its maritime environment en- 
compass 3 million square kilometers of jurisdictional waters, 32,000 coastline 
kilometers, and 6,000 land features. China also believes that it is authorized 
to regulate foreign naval vessels and military aircraft in its EEZ which is 
opposed by the U.S. and many other countries.57 
     A March 15, 2016, staff report by the U.S.–China Economic and Security 
Review Commission noted how Beijing uses both engagement and coercion 
to split ties and exploit differences in U.S. relationships with regional allies.  
China has sought to entice South Korea with promises of greater economic 
engagement at the expense of Seoul’s security relationship with Washington.  
Japanese and South Korean disputes over the Dodko/Takeshima islands in 
the Sea of Japan hamper U.S. efforts to produce a coherent Northeast Asian 
security policy.58 
      China also makes use an asymmetric strategy called “Three Warfares” 
which seeks to counter the U.S.’ Asian presence and influence in a potential 
military conflict and allow Beijing to control and shape its own security 
environment. These three warfares and illustrative examples include: 
 
Psychological Warfare: Undermining 
enemy ability to conduct combat 
operations through deterring, shocking, 
and demoralizing enemy military 
personnel and supporting civilians. 
Example: Espionage campaign against 
Taiwan seeks to weaken Taipei’s 
military morale. Spy cases can create an 
environment where acquiring Taiwanese 
defense secrets is perceived as 
inevitable. 
Media Warfare: Influences domestic 
and international public opinion in 
Beijing’s favor for Chinese military 
actions and dissuading opponents from 
trying to counter China. 
Example: On September 28, 2012, 
China purchases two page ads in the 
New York Times and Washington Post 
saying “Diaoyu (Senkaku Islands) 
Belong to China” after Japan purchased 
three islands from a private owner.  
Intended to influence U.S. public 
opinion and pressure Japan. 
Legal Warfare: Using international and 
domestic law to claim legal high ground 
and asset China’s interests. May impede 
adversary’s operational freedom and 
shape operational space. Intended to 
build international support and manage 
potential political repercussions of 
Chinese military actions. 
Example: Restricting activities of 
foreign ships and aircraft operating in or 
flying over China’s EEZ. Although 
UNCLOS permits foreign military ships 
and aircraft to conduct EEZ freedom of 
navigation and overflight, China’s 
expansive international law 
interpretation asserts the right to require 
foreign ships to obtain permission or 
provide notification before conducting 





During a June 22, 2011, national speech on the withdrawal of military forces 
from Afghanistan, President Obama unwisely claimed that “the tide of war is 
receding.”60 He repeated this same fallacious turn of phrase during an October 
21, 2011, White House press briefing on the drawdown of U.S. forces in 
Iraq.61 Subsequent events in the Middle East, South Asia, Crimea and the 
Ukraine, and many other areas of the world, including the SCS and ECS 
demonstrate the delusional folly of these remarks. 
     Jakub Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell have described how China has used 
the technique of probing to stake maritime and territorial claims in both the 
ECS and SCS to determine the response of the U.S. and its allies, along with 
the international community, to Chinese efforts to gain hegemony in these 
contested maritime spaces. They contend that probing involves determining 
if rumors of a rival country’s weakening are true and China and other 
revisionist states use probing to avoid direct military confrontation with 
existing great powers such as the United States. Revisionist powers such as 
China seek to alter the existing regional order without going to war and they 
engage in commercial pressure, diplomatic initiatives, and public awareness 
campaigns to promote their agenda. Levels of violence used are low and 
probing powers limit their activities to areas of less strategic interest to their 
rivals. Consequently probes are a calculated gamble instead of lashing out.62 
     Probing powers may use civilian or paramilitary power to harass U.S. allies 
and avoid a direct confrontation with U.S. firepower. China has used its 
fishing and fishery enforcement fleets in this regard which makes it difficult 
for the U.S. to respond. For instance, a PLAN intrusion into disputed waters 
can be confronted by the U.S. Seventh Fleet unlike a probe by civilian 
Chinese fishermen. Revisionist powers such as China see probing as a way 
of deflecting attention and retaliation from status quo powers who may be 
militarily preoccupied elsewhere. These powers also seek to avoid directly 
military targeting areas of prime military concern to the U.S. and its allies 
such as national homelands and seek to stress U.S. supply lines and cause 
questions on the worth of engaging in military activity for seemingly insig- 
nificant island territories.63 
     China is definitely interested expanding its maritime presence in the ECS.    
The map below demonstrates the importance of the first and second island 








Figure 6 First and Second Island Chains 
 
Source: Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall At Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First 
Century (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2001), 165. 
 
Ongoing events including China’s naval buildup and aggressiveness in ad- 
joining waters indicate that Beijing is interested in gaining greater influence, 
if not military superiority, in the first and second island chains region profiled 
in this map and that Neo-Mahanian thinking and aspirations are driving 
Chinese motivations.64 
     Aggressive Chinese aspirations are also reflected in some Chinese military 
writings. Liu Mengfu’s book China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Stra- 
tegic Posture in the Post-American Era sees Sun Yat-Sen as an advocate for 
global Chinese cultural and military supremacy. Liu, a retired PLA Colonel, 
contends that Sun favored learning from the U.S. and then surpassing it and 
Liu also praises Deng Xiaoping’s admonition that China should patiently 
build up its strength until it is ready to become a preeminent player on the 
global stage. Liu also believes Asia’s Warring States Period is beginning with 
China, India, and Japan acting out China’s 3rd Century Wars of the Three 
Kingdoms continentally; that China will eventually overtake the U.S., Euro- 
pean Union, and Russia to achieve global economic and strategic hegemony; 
that China must become a military power to effectively maintain its security 
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as a market power and a civilized country’s dignity; that China must have 
the ability to destroy the U.S. ability to ensure consistence, coexistence, com- 
mon security, and development; that China be able to counter U.S. military 
intervention in the Taiwan Strait; make containing China unaffordable for 
the U.S; and make it impossible for other nations to contain China. Other 
analyses of varying quality from Chinese and non-Chinese sources see China 
challenging or threatening U.S. strategic hegemony in the Western Pacific 
and comment on the unpredictable and evolving relationship between these 
two countries and adjoining ECS countries.65 
     Another sign of China’s increasingly assertive conduct was reflected in 
President Xi Jinping’s November 29, 2014, speech to the Communist Party’s 
Foreign Affairs Conference. In this address, he stressed the importance of 
military activity and using China’s military to effectively apply Chinese power 
and influence to support a more ambitious foreign policy, restricting U.S. 
geopolitical influence, upholding Chinese territorial sovereignty, maritime 
rights, and supporting Beijing’s positions in territorial and island disputes.66 
     The PLAN has clearly been increasing its strength to coercively wield its 
increasing firepower and military capabilities to exert its will in the ECS and 
other maritime regions of contention.67 China’s ECS fleet is headquartered in 
Nanjing Province with its headquarters at Ningbo. Its latitudinal area of 
responsibility ranges from 23⁰ 30’ North to 35⁰10’ North and contains major 
bases in Shanghai (surface ships), Wuhan (submarines) Xiangshan (subma- 
rines), and Zhoushan (surface ships). Its order of battle includes destroyer, 
frigate, landing ship, and submarine flotillas. PLAF assets in this province 
include a bomber division and fighter division along with a missile base and 
missile units. PLA assets in this province include the 1st, 12th, and 31st Group 
Armies who could be deployed in any potential operation against Taiwan or 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.  China’s active duty military personnel number 
2,333,000, as of 2015.68  
     Japan’s active duty military forces numbered 247,150 in 2015 with 
45,500 of these belonging to the JMSDF and 47,100 to the JASDF. Tokyo’s 
2015 Defense White Paper stressed emerging risks posed by China and North 
Korea and between May-September 2015 Japan’s Diet passed legislation 
liberalizing Japan’s ability to exercise collective self-defense, enhance Japa- 
nese non-combat logistical support for the U.S. and other allies, and removing 
the need to enact separate laws for each JSDF deployment providing logis- 
tical support to multinational forces. Japan’s 2015 Defense White Paper 
announced plans to expand its combat aircraft from 349–360, aircraft warn- 
ing squadrons from 20–28, its destroyer fleet from 47–54, and the submarine 
fleet from 5–6.69  
     South Korean and Taiwanese forces could also conceivably be drawn into 
conflict in the ECS due to some of their economic and geopolitical interests 
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in these waters not coinciding with those of Japan and China and due to 
lingering historical animosity from the World War II era.70 
     The U.S.’ ECS military presence is dominated by the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet 
which is Washington’s largest forward deployed fleet whose operational area 
extends from the India/Pakistan border to the Kuril Islands to Antarctica.   
This force consists of approximately 50–70 ships and submarines, 140 air- 
craft and approximately 20,000 sailors. Its flagship is the aircraft carrier USS 
Ronald Reagan and its surface combatants include 10–14 destroyers and 
cruisers with 11 of these being at Japan’s Yokosuka Naval Base. These ships 
carry theater ballistic missile interceptors, long-range Tomahawk land attack 
missiles and anti-aircraft missiles. 7th fleet submarines are nuclear powered 
and the fleet contains 16–20 reconnaissance aircraft providing regional intel- 
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.71  
Additional U.S. military forces readily accessible to deploy in the event 
of ECS contingency operations include assets on Okinawa and Guam.  
Okinawa’s Kadena Air Base includes two fighter squadrons and one air 
refueling squadron, the Marine Corps Northern Training Area and Camp 
Courtney featuring the 3rd Marine Force Expeditionary Headquarters, Guam’s 
Anderson Air Force Base and Guam Naval Base, 25,000 overall personnel in 




The ECS is part of Nicholas Spykman’s Asian rimland and a potential 
shatterbelt for military conflict due to its proximity to China, Japan, Taiwan, 
and the Korean Peninsula and the international economic and strategic 
significance of the waters adjacent to these and other countries and their 
trade flows. This geopolitical significance and conflict potential is further 
augmented by the U.S.’ historically enduring and contemporarily significant 
economic interests and military presence in this region along with Wash- 
ington’s explicit military alliances with Japan and South Korea and the 
implicit military defense of Taiwan from Chinese invasion contained in the 
1979 Taiwan Relations Act.73      
     The Obama Administration has heralded an “Asia-Pacific Pivot” in U.S. 
military force structure. However, this move has not been reinforced with 
funding, force augmentation, appropriate equipment, and requisite strategic 
doctrine. The Defense Department’s Air and Sea Battle Doctrine, now called 
Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAMGC) 
has some useful characteristics which the U.S. should implement to strengthen 
its strategic position and those of its allies in the ECS. It is essential for the 
U.S. take the lead in successfully implementing and properly resourcing 
JAMGC in the intermediate future. Since China aspires to use Anti-Access 
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Aerial Denial (A2/AD) capabilities to deny U.S. access to the Western 
Pacific, the U.S. should focus on using airpower to defeat anti-ship weapons, 
naval power for neutralizing land-based threats against air and naval forces, 
and cyber operations to defeat space systems. The U.S. should operate under 
the policy that an opponent such as China will use its A2/AD capabilities 
with little or no warning against Western Pacific or even continental U.S. 
military assets requiring immediate and effective response.74  
     The U.S. must include specific funding levels and specify overall opera- 
tional purposes for JAMGC force structure planning and deployment in 
annual DOD budgets with both DOD and Congress playing collaborative 
roles to bring this about. National security strategy documents such as forth- 
coming National Military Strategy of the United States, National Security 
Strategy of the United States, and Quadrennial Defense Review documents 
must integrate JAMGC into their recommendations. Specific doctrinal guid- 
ance implementing JAMGC must also be incorporated into Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Joint Electronic Library publications including JP 3-0 Joint Operations, 
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats, JP 3-03 Joint Interdiction, JP 
3-05 Special Operations, JP 3-16 Multinational Operations, JP 3-30 Com- 
mand and Control of Joint Air Operations and JP 3-60 Joint Targeting along 
with relevant individual U.S. armed service branch doctrinal publications.75   
     Additional attributes of successful strategy in the event of war with China 
include disrupting Beijing’s command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities by denying 
them the ability to track and locate targets consequently precluding attack on 
friendly forces. The U.S. and its allies should also seek to decapitate hostile 
A2/AD assets reducing their strike launching ability and enhancing the sur- 
vivability of friendly forces. In addition, developing and deploying conven- 
tional ballistic missiles and hypersonic delivery vehicles capable of reaching 
China away from its defensive envelope would circumvent Beijing’s existing 
A2/AD network and give PLA planners and strategists new, difficult, and 
expensive technical and operational challenges. They could also attack 
Chinese coastal strategic assets, those within the Middle Kingdom’s interior, 
use assets with have greater lethality against hardened or deeply buried 
targets. The U.S. and its allies should also attack China’s cyber war assets 
including People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Unit 61398 and enhance U.S. 
cyber defense capabilities against Beijing’s strikes.76 
     The following chart illustrates the increasing prevalence of precision 






  Figure 7 PGMS by Category Procured by DOD from 2001 through 2014 
 
  Source: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
 
The U.S. and its allies should also develop an archipelagic defense architecture 
in disputed regions such as the ECS. Washington and its allies should seek to 
deny China the ability to control air and sea corridors around the First Island 
Chain. Air defenses in the First Island Chain should be augmented by 
employing army units with highly mobile and simple short-range interceptor 
missiles supported by Giraffe radar systems to detect targets. The U.S. Army 
and Japan could operate more advanced longer-range systems capable of 
intercepting Chinese cruise missiles and destroying advanced Chinese air- 
craft. Efforts should also be made to deny China the sea control prerequisite 
for launching offensive operations against these islands. This can be done by 
reinstating a coastal defense artillery force and the Navy can also lay and clear 
mines to restrict or allow transit through narrow seas and straits. Strengthen- 
ing regional ballistic missile defense systems such as the Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-
3) are also critical components of enhancing our regional strategic posture.77   
     In the event of a Chinese invasion, a small number of U.S. ground forces 
could serve as a tripwire by mounting determined resistance. This would 
facilitate the time needed for U.S. air and naval forces to respond against 
China with long-range surveillance and air strikes. The U.S. can also augment 
its deterrent capability and combat readiness in these islands by strengthen- 
ing existing battle network vulnerabilities such as satellites and non-stealth 
unmanned aerial vehicles which the PLA could target. Reducing the risk to 
this communications network by establishing underground and under the 
seabed fiber optic cables would allow U.S. and allied forces to safely receive 
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and transmit data from hardened command centers on land. In addition, 
island-based air defense and sea denial forces, along with antiship minefields, 
could protect cable lines running between the islands.78 
A January 2016 study by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) made four salient recommendations for the U.S. Asia–Pacific 
rebalance out to 2025. These are: 
• Washington needs to continue aligning Asia strategy within the U.S. 
Government with allies and partners. 
• U.S. leaders should accelerate U.S. efforts to strengthen ally and partner 
capability, capacity, resilience, and interoperability. 
• The United States should sustain and expand U.S. military presence in the 
Asia-Pacific. 
• The United States should accelerate development of innovative capabilities 
and concepts for U.S. forces.79 
 
This document also issued a clarion call for the U.S. to remain actively 
engaged in the ECS and Western Pacific with the following assertion: 
 
The U.S. military is a stabilizing force in the region, helping to 
deter conflict on the Korean Peninsula and manage crises from the 
East China Sea through the Indian Ocean. Yet, the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army’s anti-access/area denial capabilities that many 
once viewed as Taiwan specific, are rapidly expanding to the 
Second Island Chain and beyond, affecting not only an increasing 
number of U.S. allies and partners, but also U.S. territories such as 
Guam. Diversification of U.S. military posture remains critical not 
simply for resilience against challenges in Northeast Asia, but also 
to contend with the growing importance of Southeast Asia and the 
Indian Ocean region. We reject the option of withdrawal from the 
Western Pacific because of these new challenges. Such a with- 
drawal could lead to rapid deterioration of the security environ- 
ment and render operations more difficult rather than easier.80 
 
The U.S. must be assertive in defending its interests and those of Japan and 
the international community against Chinese hegemony. The U.S. should seek 
to maintain open and candid communications with Beijing and strive to avoid 
confrontation. Washington also needs to restore economic solvency in its 
domestic policymaking, assert unflinching strategic clarity in its China and 
international security policymaking, maintain a strong military presence in 
East Asia to enhance regional peace and stability, and acknowledge China’s 
increasing ascendancy and track record of behavior antagonistic to U.S. and 
allied strategic interests. Essential elements of U.S. and allied strategy for 
addressing Beijing’s ECS aspirations should include developing assertive and 
agile traditional and social media campaigns stressing the desire to maintain 
cooperative and stable relations with China, effectively countering Chinese 
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public diplomatic claims about its ECS objectives, and warning global 
opinion of the dangers of allowing China to attain strategic preeminence in 
the ECS and other adjoining international waters.81 
Prudent geopolitical calculation and hedging, along with the enduring 
prevalence of military conflict, national aggression, and irrationality in history, 
requires that the U.S. and its allies candidly prepare domestic and interna- 
tional public opinion for the potential of future military confrontation with 
China and equip and fund their military forces for the possibility of protracted 
and ultimately victorious conflict in the ECS. A Harvard Belfer Center’s 
Thucydides Trap Case File project documents 16 historical cases of the inter- 
actions between rising powers such as China and status quo powers such as 
the U.S covering from the 16th century to the present and encompassing 
countries from North America, Europe, and Asia. Project findings reveal that 
12 of these 16 scenarios produced war.82 
The U.S. should also explicitly declare that the Senkaku Islands fall 
within the parameters of the U.S. security treaty with Japan and give the 
military liberal rules of engagement to forcefully defend against Chinese 
attempts to impede air or sea passage through the ECS. Such American asser- 
tiveness will require a more strategically and geopolitically minded presi- 
dential administration and the willingness and ability to repeatedly educate 
U.S. public opinion on the critical strategic importance of the Western Pacific 
and ECS to national interests and not allowing these regions to come under 
Chinese dominance which would likely threaten international freedom of 
access and navigation in the ECS.83 
Japan must explicitly admit its responsibility for World War II era 
atrocities and work tirelessly to improve relations with its neighbors such as 
South Korea. Tokyo must continue increasing its share of defense spending 
and its willingness to engage in offensive military operations in view of the 
deteriorating regional security environment caused by Chinese, North Korean, 
and Russian aggressiveness and provocations. This will require Japanese 
leaders to educate their public opinion in the hard knocks realities of con- 
temporary regional geopolitics and for international opinion to recognize that 
Japan can no longer be strategically constricted by its historic World War II 
aggression and recent pacifism as it seeks to defend its vital national interests 
in a deteriorating regional security environment.84 
     Japan and other East Asian countries concerned about China’s rise and 
uncertainty about U.S. commitment to maintaining regional security will seek 
to maintain geopolitical and strategic flexibility by enhancing their security 
cooperation and military force enhancement. The proposed submarine project 
involving Australia and Japan is an example of this hedging in response to 
Chinese assertiveness and the potential lessening of the U.S. strategic presence 
and commitment to the ECS region.85 
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     The ECS is becoming an increasingly important economically and military 
region for the U.S. and its allies. This economic importance is documented 
by bilateral trade between the U.S. and China for the first quarter of 2016 
being $128.372.4 billion; $47.053.8 billion between the U.S. and Japan, 
$27.647.1 billion between the U.S. and South Korea, and $15.202 billion 
between the U.S. and Taiwan with most of this trade being seaborne occurring 
in the ECS.86 
     China is a great civilization and has the choice of being a rising and 
responsible stakeholder restraining from disruptive action and territorial 
aggrandizement. Conversely, it may also continue taking steps to upset the 
East Asian security order by engaging in realistic Western Pacific military 
combat exercises and wallowing in the victim mentality of historical defeats 
by lashing out at its geopolitical and maritime competitors, seeking to coerce 
its neighbors, and trying to reclaim land from adjoining oceanic waters such 
as the Paracel and Spratly Islands.87 
The U.S. and the international community must ensure that China does 
not dominate these waters and impose fraudulent claims about national 
sovereignty and territorial possession on ECS waters and natural resources 
on the international polity. The next U.S. presidential administration will face 
a critical test of its international credibility by how well or poorly it stands 
up to Chinese assertiveness in these waters. It will need to reaffirm and 
muster sustained international support for freedom of aerial and maritime 
navigation while trying to peacefully resolve disputes with China. At the 
same time, it must also equip U.S. and allied military forces with the means 
necessary to deter and defeat China if this dispute erupts into war. If war 
erupts, it will be necessary for the U.S. and its allies to act aggressively and 
decisively to impose their Clausewitzian will on China and defeat Beijing’s 
aspirations for regional hegemony. The aftermath of a military confrontation 
with China should also include U.S. and allied preparation for post-conflict 
stabilization to restore international order and stability benefitting the inter- 
national community as well as military combatant powers without humiliating 
China and stoking its desire for a revanchist postbellum environment. Doing 
these things will require a robust conservative internationalism and geopoli- 










NOTES AND REFERENCES 
 
     1. See Bert Chapman, “China’s Nine-Dashed Map: Continuing Maritime Source 
of Geopolitical Tension,” Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, 8 
(1)(2016): 146–168; and U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress:  
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 
(Washington, DC: DOD, 2016): 7, 13, 58, 67–68; http://www.defense.gov/ 
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf; 
(Accessed May 16, 2016) 
     2. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on 
Asia and the Pacific,” Resourcing the Pivot to Asia:  East Asia and Pacific FY 2015 
Budget Priorities, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014): http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/ 
gpo50835; (Accessed May 2, 2016); Harry Kazianis, “Air-Sea Battle’s Next Step:  
JAM-GC on Deck,” The National Interest, (November 25, 2015): 1–2; http:// 
nationalinterest.org/feature/air-sea-battles-next-step-jam-gc-deck-14440; (Accessed 
May 16, 2016); and Nina Silove, “The Pivot Before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to 
Preserve the Power Balance in Asia,” International Security, 40 (4)(Spring 2016):  
45–88; doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00238.  
     3. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, East China Sea, (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Energy Information Administration, September 17, 2014): 1–3; https:// 
www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/regions_of_interest/East_China_S
ea/east_china_sea.pdf; (Accessed May 2, 2016); Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for 
Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, (New York:  
W.W. Norton & Co., 2011): 7; U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin- 
istration, Tide Tables 2015 High and Low Water Predictions: Central and Western 
Pacific Ocean, (Washington, DC: NOAA, 2015): 47; http://tidesandcurrents.noaa. 
gov/tidetables/2015/pttt2015book.pdf; (Accessed May 2, 2016); and Jiangxia Lia, 
Yongping Chena, Shunqi Panc, Yi Pana, Jiayu Fanga, and Derrick M.A. Sowaa, 
“Estimation of Mean and Extreme Waves in the East China Seas,” Applied Ocean 
Research, 56 (March 2016):  35–47; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apor.2016.01.005. 
     4. See Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Trade Flows in Asia, (Washington, 
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016); http://amti.csis.org/atlas/; 
(Accessed May 2, 2016); U.S. Census Bureau, Top Trading Partners–December 
2015, (Washington, DC: The Census Bureau, 2016): 1; http://www.census.gov/ 
foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1512yr.html; (Accessed May 2, 2016); and 
Top 50 World Container Ports, (Washington, DC: World Shipping Council, 2016):  
1; http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/top-50-world-con- 
tainer-ports; (Accessed May 2, 2016). 
     5. See Mark E. Manyin, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty 
Obligations, (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Ser- 
vice, 2013):  2–3; https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf; (Accessed March 5, 
2016); China, State Council Information Office, Daioyu Dao, An Inherent Territory 
of China, (Beijing: State Council Information Office, 2012); http://www.gov.cn/ 
english/official/2012-09/25/content_2232763.htm; (Accessed May 2, 2016). 
     6. See Mankin, 3; Peter N. Upton, “International Law and the Sino-Japanese 
Controversy over the Territorial Sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands,” Boston 
 46 
University Law Review, 52 (Fall 1972): 767; and Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
“Japanese Territory: Senkaku Islands,” (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016):   
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/; (Accessed May 2, 2016). 
     7. U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International 
Agreements, 3 (Pt. 3)(1952): 3169, 3173–3174; http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id 
=msu.31293012256693;view=1up;seq=2; (Accessed May 2, 2016). 
     8. See Manyin, 4; Committee for the Coordination of Joint Prospecting for 
Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas, Report of the Fifth Session, (Bangkok:  
The Committee, 1968); Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “The U.S. Role in the Sino-Japa- 
nese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, 1945–1971,” The China Quarterly, 
161 (March 2000): 95–123; and Arnold G. Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu 
Islands, 1945–1950. (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988). 
     9. See John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York:  
W.W. Norton & Company, 2001); Jonathan Kirshner, “The Tragedy of Offensive 
Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China,” European Journal of Interna- 
tional Relations, 18 (1)(2012): 53–75; DOI: 10.1177/1354066110373949; Richard 
N. Rosecrance, The Next Great War?: The Roots of World War I and the Risk of 
U.S.-China Conflict, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015); Jeremy Black, Geopolitics and 
the Quest for Dominance, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016): 241, 252, 
265, 317; and Zhengyu Wu, “The Crowe Memorandum, the Rebalance to Asia, and 
Sino-U.S. Relations,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 39 (2016): 1–28; DOI: 10.1080/ 
01402390.2016.1140648. 
     10. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Okinawa Reversion 
Treaty Hearings, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1971): 91. 
     11. See United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, 11 (pt. 
2)(1960):  1633;  http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=msu.31293012256917;view=1 
up;seq=342; (Accessed May 3, 2016); and Okinawa Reversion Treaty Hearings, 22, 
42, 44. 
     12. U.S. Department of State, “Remarks and Q&A at the Japan National Press 
Club,” (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2004): 1–4; http://2001-2009.state. 
gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/28699.htm; (Accessed May 3, 2016). 
     13. Ibid., “Remarks with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Gia Keim,” (Wash- 
ington, DC: Department of State, 2010); 2–3; http://m.state.gov/md150189.htm; 
(Accessed May 3, 2016). 
     14. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Press Conference with 
President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan,” (Washington, DC: The White 
House, April 24, 2014): 5; https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/24/ 
joint-press-conference-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan; (Accessed 
May 3, 2016). 
     15. U.S. Department of Defense, The Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Coop- 
eration, (Washington, DC: DOD, April 27, 2015): http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/ 
20150427_--_GUIDELINES_FOR_US-JAPAN_DEFENSE_COOPERATION.pdf; 
(Accessed May 3, 2016). 
     16. Manyin, 6. 
     17. Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, “International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the Sen- 
kaku Islands,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 29 (4)(2008):  
 47 
906–907, 928; http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss4/2/; (Accessed June 21, 
2016). 
     18. Manyin, 6. 
     19. Ian E. Rinehart and Bart Elias, China’s Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ), (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
2015): 1, 6–8; https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43894.pdf; (Accessed May 3, 2016). 
     20. Michael Pilger, ADIZ Update: Enforcement in the East China Sea, Prospects 
for the South China Sea, and Implications for the United States. Washington, DC:  
U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016): 3–5; http://origin. 
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ADIZ%20Update_0.pdf; (Accessed May 
3, 2016). 
     21. See Ibid., 6; Japan, Ministry of Defense, “Statistics on Scrambles through   
Fiscal Year 2015,” (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, April 22, 2016): 1, 3–4; http:// 
www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2016/press_pdf/p20160422_03.pdf; (Accessed May 17, 
2016); Japan’s fiscal year runs from April 1–March 31; and East China Sea Ten- 
sions: Approaching a Boil, (Washington, DC: Asia Maritime Security Initiative, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016): 8–10; http://amti.csis.org/east-
china-sea-tensions/; (Accessed May 3, 2016).  
     22. See Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-
First Century, 2nd edn., (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010): 156; Chris Parry, 
Super Highway: Sea Power in the 21st Century, (London: Elliott and Thompson 
Limited, 2014): 220–229); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (New 
York: UNCLOS, 2016): 40; http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf; (Accessed May 4, 2016); Lee Chang-Wee, “The EEZ 
Regime in Northeast Asia: Legal Status of the EEZ and Military Activities in the 
EEZ,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 28 (1)(March 2016): 77–78; U.S. 
Department of Defense, CNMI Joint Military Training EIS/OEIS: About, (Washing- 
ton, DC: DOD, 2016): 1; http://www.cnmijointmilitarytrainingeis.com/about; 
(Accessed May 4, 2016); and Ibid., Freedom of Navigation Report for Fiscal Year 
2014, (Washington, DC: DOD, March 23, 2015): 1; http://policy.defense.gov/ 
Portals/11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/20150323%202015%20DoD%20Annual%20FON
%20Report.pdf; (Accessed May 4, 2016). 
     23. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2016, (116):  
20, 22–23, 240.  
     24. See Ibid., 215, and China, State Council Information Office, China’s Military 
Strategy, (Beijing: State Council Information Office, May 2015): 4–10; http:// 
english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm; 
(Accessed May 4, 2016). 
     25. Ibid., 230. 
     26. Japan, Ministry of National Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines 
for Fy 2014 and Beyond December 17, 2013, (Tokyo: Ministry of National Defense, 
2013): 4–15; www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html; (Accessed May 4, 2016). 
     27. Ibid., 31. 
     28. Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter, The Tools of Owatatsumi: Japan’s Ocean 
Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities, (Canberra: Australian National 
 48 
University Press, 2015): http://press.anu.edu.au/publications/tools-owatatsumi; 
(Accessed May 17, 2016). 
     29. Ibid., Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of FY 2016 Budget, 
(Tokyo: Ministry of National Defense, 2016): 5–10; http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_ 
budget/pdf/280330.pdf; (Accessed May 4, 2016). 
     30. April 4, 2016 search of China National Knowledge Infrastructure, http:// 
oversea.cnki.net/kns55/default.aspx. Accessed through Purdue University Libraries 
subscription. 
     31. Ibid. 
     32. Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of 
Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,” International Security, 23 (3)(Winter 
1998/99): 126; DOI:10.1162/isec.23.3.114. 
     33. See Ibid., 128–130; and Erik Beukel, Popular Nationalism in China and the 
Sino-Japanese Relationship: The Conflict in the East China Sea: An Introductory 
Study, (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2011): 12; http:// 
pure.diis.dk/ws/files/61200/RP_2011_01_China_Japan-web.pdf; (Accessed May 5, 
2016). 
     34. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone, (Sydney: Australasian Legal Information Institute, University of 
Technology, Sydney, 2016): 1; http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/lotprocott 
satcz739/; (Accessed May 5, 2016). 
     35. Beukel, 12–13; and Downs and Saunders, 133–134. 
     36. bid., 13–14; and Ibid., 134–138. 
     37. See Zhongqi Pan, “Sino-Chinese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands:  
The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Chinese 
Political Science, 12 (1)(Spring 2007): 76; DOI:10.1007/s11366-007-9002-6; Liu 
Sheng-Deng, “China’s Popular Nationalism on the Internet: Report on the 2005 
Anti-Japan Network Struggles,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 7 (1)(2006): 144–155; 
DOI:10.1080/14649370500463802; M. Taylor Fravel, “Explaining Stability in the 
Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute,” in Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing 
China–Japan–US Relations, Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokobun, and Wang Jsi, eds., 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2010): 149–150; http://www.jcie.org/ 
researchpdfs/Triangle/7_fravel.pdf); (Accessed May 5, 2016);  and Beukel 14-16. 
     38. See Ibid., 16–17; Wayne M. Morrison and Rachel Tang, “China’s Rare Earth 
Industry and Export Regime: Economic and Trade Implications for the United States,” 
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2012): 1–
2, 27, 31–32; http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42510.pdf; (Accessed May 5, 2016); 
U.S. Department of Energy, Critical Materials Strategy, (Washington, DC: DOE, 
2011): http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/DOE_CMS2011_FINAL_Full.pdf; (Accessed 
May 5, 2016); and U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcom- 
mittee on Asia and the Pacific, China’s Monopoly on Rare Earths: Implications for 
U.S. Foreign and Security Policy, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011): 1; http://purl. 
fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo16186; (Accessed May 5, 2016). 
     39. See Paul J. Smith, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy: A Crisis Post- 
poned,” Naval War College Review, 66 (2)(Spring 2013): 27–28; https://www. 
usnwc.edu/getattachment/bfa92a47-1f5f-4c23-974c-f92e1ed27be4/The-Senkaku-
 49 
Diaoyu-Island-Controversy--A-Crisis-Po.aspx; (Accessed May 5, 2016); and 
Alessio Patalano, “The East China Sea, Maritime Strategy, and Sino-Japanese 
Security Relations.” In China and International Security: History, Strategy, and 
21st. Century Policy.  Donovan C. Chau, and Thomas M. Kane, eds. (Santa Barbara:  
ABC-CLIO, 2014): 3:128. 
     40. See Smith, 39; and Japan, Ministry of National Defense, Defense of Japan, 
(Tokyo: Ministry of National Defense, 2012); 36; http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/ 
w_paper/pdf/2012/07_Part1_Chapter1_Sec3.pdf; (Accessed May 5, 2016). 
     41. See Yuka Hiyashi, “Japan to Boost Defense in the Pacific, Minister Says,” 
Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2012: A11; and Michael A. McDevitt and Catherine 
K. Lea, CNA Maritime Asia Project: Workshop Two Naval Developments in Asia, 
(Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analyses, 2004): 4; https://www.cna.org/CNA_ 
files/PDF/DCP-2012-U-002417-Final.pdf; (Accessed May 6, 2016). 
     42. Old Scores and New Grudges: Evolving Sino-Japanese Tensions, (Brussels:  
International Crisis Group, 2014): 3–5, 39; http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media 
/Files/asia/north-east-asia/258-old-scores-and-grudges-evolving-sino-japanese-
tensions.pdf; (Accessed May 6, 2016). 
     43. Guilio Pugliese, “The China Challenge, Abe Shinzo’s Realism, and the Limits 
of Japanese Nationalism,” SAIS Review of International Affairs, 35 (2)(Summer/Fall 
2015): 45–55; DOI:10.1353/sais.2015.0030; and The 10th China-Japan Public 
Opinion Poll: Analysis Report on the Comparative Data, (Tokyo and Beijing: The 
Genro NPO and China Daily, June 9, 2014): 6, 15, 26, 29; http://www.genron-
npo.net/en/pp/docs/10th_Japan-China_poll.pdf; (Accessed May 6, 2016). 
     44. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on 
Asia and the Pacific, The Emergence of China Throughout Asia: Security and 
Economic Consequences for the United States, (Washington, DC:  GPO, 2006): 17;   
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS67432; (Accessed May 6, 2016). 
     45. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, China: Recent Security 
Developments, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010): 17–19; http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo 
2192; (Accessed May 6, 2016). 
     46. Ibid., House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Investigating the Chinese Threat, 
Part 1: Military and Economic Aggression, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012); http:// 
purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo24170; (Accessed May 6, 2016). 
     47. Caitlin Campbell, Kimberly Hsu, and Craig Murray, China’s “Core Interests”: 
and the East China Sea, (Washington, DC: U.S.–China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, 2013): 2–6; http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
Research/China’s%20Core%20Interests%20and%20the%20East%20China%20Sea.
pdf; (Accessed May 6, 2016). 
     48. U.S. Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Resolving 
Crises in East Asia through a New System of Collective Security: The Helsinki 
Process as a Model, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014): 4, 21, 25; https://www.gpo. 
gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113jhrg95402/pdf/CHRG-113jhrg95402.pdf; (Accessed May 
6, 2016). 
     49. U.S. Congress, House Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittees on Seapower and Projection Forces and Asia and the Pacific, 
 50 
Maritime Sovereignty in the East and South China Seas, (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2014): 8; http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo50612; (Accessed May 6, 2016). 
     50. Ibid., 11–12. 
     51. Ibid. 
     52. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia 
and the Pacific, America’s Future in Asia: From Rebalancing to Managing Sover- 
eignty Disputes. (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014): 30; http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo 
48894; (Accessed May 9, 2016). 
     53. Ibid., 46-47. 
     54. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Strengthening U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia, 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2015): 8, 32, http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo55200; (Accessed 
May 9, 2016). 
     55. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia 
and the Pacific, Markup: Reaffirming the Peaceful and Collaborative Resolution of 
Maritime and Jurisdictional Disputes in the South China Sea and the East China 
Sea as Provided for by Universally Recognized Principles of International Law and 
Reaffirming the Strong Support of the United States Government for Freedom of 
Navigation and Other Internationally Lawful Uses of the Sea and Airspace in the 
Asia-Pacific Region: Markup on H. Res. 714 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014): 
http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo53090; (Accessed May 9, 2016). 
     56. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on 
Seapower and Projection Forces, The Role of Surface Forces in Presence, Deter- 
rence, and Warfighting. (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015): 8–10; http://purl.fdlp.gov/ 
GPO/gpo59044; (Accessed May 9, 2016). 
     57. See U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and 
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, (Washing- 
ton, DC: DOD, 2015): 3; http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_ 
China_Military_Power_Report.pdf; (Accessed May 9, 2016); and Ryan T. Martinez, 
From Words to Actions: The Creation of the China Coast Guard, (Arlington, VA:  
China as a “Maritime Power” Conference, Center for Naval Analyses, July 28–29, 
2015): 1–5; https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/creation-china-coast-guard.pdf; 
(Accessed May 9, 2016). 
     58. Kristin Bergerson, China’s Efforts to Counter U.S. Forward Presence in the 
Asia Pacific, (Washington, DC: U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Com- 
mission, 2016): 7;  http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC% 
20Staff%20Report%20on%20China%20Countering%20US%20Military%20Presen
ce%20in%20Asia.pdf; (Accessed May 9, 2016). 
     59. Ibid., 8. For a detailed analysis of China’s Three Warfares see Stefan Halper, 
China: The Three Warfares. (Washington, DC: Prepared for Andrew Marshall, U.S. 
Department of Defense, Office of Net Assessment, 2013): http://images.smh.com. 
au/file/2014/04/11/5343124/China_%2520The%2520three%2520warfares.pdf?rand
=1397212645609; (Accessed May 9, 2016). 
     60. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Barack Obama 2011:  
Book 1 January 1–June 30, 2011, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014): 692; https://www. 
 51 
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2011-book1/pdf/PPP-2011-book1-Doc-pg691.pdf; 
(Accessed May 9, 2016). 
     61. “Remarks by the President on Ending the War in Iraq,” (Washington, DC:  
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, October 21, 2011): 3; https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/21/remarks-president-ending-war-
iraq; (Accessed May 9, 2016). 
     62. Jakub Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, 
Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2016): 47–48. 
     63. Ibid., 49–57. 
     64. See Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, “Command of the Seas With 
Chinese Characteristics,” Orbis, 49 (4)(Fall 2005): 677–694; http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.orbis.2005.07.008; Ibid., “The Influence of Mahan upon China’s Maritime 
Strategy,” Comparative Strategy, 24 (1)(2005): 23–51; DOI:10.1080/014959305 
90929663; Ibid., Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. 
Maritime Supremacy, (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 2010; and Andrew S. 
Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, “Barriers, Springboards, and Benchmarks: China Con- 
ceptualizes the Pacific “Island Chains,” The China Quarterly, 225 (March 2016): 1–
22; DOI:10.1017/S0305741016000011.  
     65. Liu Mengfu, The China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture 
in the Post-American Era, (New York: CN Times Books, 2015). See also James 
Miles, “Chinese Nationalism, US Policy, and Asian Security,” Survival, 42 (4)(2000):  
51–72; DOI:10.1093/survival/42.4.51; David Lai, Asia-Pacific: A Strategic Assess- 
ment, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013); Geoffrey Till, A New Type of 
Great Power Relationship between the United States and China: The Military 
Dimension, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014); Jonathan Holslag, China’s 
Coming War with Asia, (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015); Michael Pillsbury, The 
Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global 
Superpower, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2015); Liu Mingfu, “The 
World Is Too Important to Be Left to America,” Atlantic Monthly, (June 4, 2015); 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/china-dream-liu-mingfu-
power/394748/; (Accessed May 9, 2016); and Peter Navarro, Crouching Tiger: What 
China’s Militarism Means for the World, (New York: Prometheus Books, 2015). 
     66. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “The 
Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Was Held in Beijing,” 
(Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 29, 2014): 1–4; http://www.fmprc. 
gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1215680.shtml; (Accessed May 9, 2016); and 
Michael D. Swaine, “Xi Jinping on Chinese Foreign Relations: The Governance of 
China and Chinese Commentary,” China Leadership Monitor, 48 (Fall 2015): 
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm48ms.pdf; (Accessed May 
9, 2016). 
     67. See China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities, Peter Dutton, Andrew S. Erick- 
son, and Ryan Martinson, eds., (Newport:  U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime 
Studies Institute, 2014); https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-
Studies-Institute/Publications/documents/Web-CMS11-(1)-(1).aspx; (Accessed May 
9, 2016); Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the 
 52 
Pacific, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014); and Alexander Chieh-Cheng 
Huang, “The PLA and Near Seas Maritime Sovereignty Disputes,” in The People’s 
Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China, Andrew Scobell, Arthur S. 
Ding, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott W. Harold, eds., (Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Press, 2015):  279–299. 
     68. See Cole, 74; and Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, (Washington, DC:  
DOD, 2015): 82–83; and The Military Balance 2016, 240. 
     69. Ibid., 229–230, 260–262, and Japan, Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan  
2015, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2015): Digest Part II: 4; http://www.mod.go.jp/ 
e/publ/w_paper/2015.html; (Accessed May 10, 2016). 
     70. See Mark J. Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, 
and Possible Solutions,” Asian Perspective, 31 (1)(2007): 127–167; Philip A. Seaton, 
Japan’s Contested War Memories: The “Memory Rifts” in Historical Consciousness 
in World War II, (London: Routledge, 2007); Asia Looks Seaward: Power and 
Maritime Strategy, Toshi Yoshihari and James R. Holmes, ed., (Santa Barbara:  
Praeger Security International, 2008); Yi Che, Julan Du, Yi Lu, and Zhigang Tao, 
“Once an Enemy, Forever an Enemy?: The Long Run Impact of the Japanese 
Invasion of China from 1937 to 1945 on Trade and Investment, Journal of Inter- 
national Economics, 96 (1)(May 2015): 182–198; doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2015. 
01.001; The Military Balance 2016, 267–270, 290–293; and Border Disputes: A 
Global Encyclopedia, Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, ed. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 
2015): Volume 3. 
     71. U.S. Navy, United States Seventh Fleet, (Yokosuku, Japan, n.d.): 1–2; http:// 
www.c7f.navy.mil/Portals/8/documents/7thFleetTwoPagerFactsheet.pdf?ver=2016-
01-27-061248-087; (Accessed May 10, 2016). 
     72. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, and Mark Cancian, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 
2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships: An Independent Review of U.S. 
Defense Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2016): 34–37; http://csis.org/files/publication/160119_Green_ 
AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf; (Accessed May 10, 2016). 
     73. See Nicholas Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United 
States and the Balance of Power, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1942); 
Ibid., The Geography of the Peace, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 
1944); Public Law 96–8, “Taiwan Relations Act,” 93 U.S. Statutes at Large, 14–21; 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-93/pdf/STATUTE-93-Pg14.pdf; (Accessed 
May 10, 2016); Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver, “An Uncertain Relation- 
ship: The United States, Taiwan, and the Taiwan Relations Act,” The China Quar- 
terly, 165 (March 2001): 147–172; DOI:10.1017/S0009443901000080; and Bert 
Chapman, Geopolitics: A Guide to the Issues, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011): 245, 
247. 
     74. See Robbin F. Laird, Edward Timperlake, and Richard Weitz, Rebuilding 
American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy, (Santa Barbara:  
Praeger, 2013); and Aaron Friedberg, Beyond Air Sea Battle:  The Debate Over U.S. 
Military Strategy in Asia, (London: IISS, 2014): 77; http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1944 
5571.2014.914674. 
 53 
     75. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, 
(Washington, DC: JCS, 2011); Joint Publication 3-01: Countering Air and Missile 
Threats, (Washington, DC: JCS, 2012); Joint Publication 3-03: Joint Interdiction, 
(Washington, DC: JCS, 2011); Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations, (Wash- 
ington, DC: JCS, 2014); Joint Publication 3-16: Multinational Operations (Wash- 
ington, DC: JCS, 2013); Joint Publication 3-30: Command and Control of Joint Air 
Operations, (Washington, DC: JCS, 2014); Joint Publication 3-60: Joint Targeting, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm; (Accessed May 17, 
2016); and Mandiant Consulting, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage 
Units, (Reston, VA: Mandiant Consulting, 2013); http://intelreport.mandiant.com/ 
Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf; (Accessed May 17, 2016). 
     76. See Friedberg, 78, 93, 96; Barry Watts, The Evolution of Precision Strike, 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013): http:// 
csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Evolution-of-Precision-Strike-final-
v15.pdf; Mark Gunzinger and Brian Clark, Sustaining America’s Precision Strike 
Advantage, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 
2015); http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Sustaining-Americas-
Precision-Strike-Advantage.pdf; and U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to 
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 
China, (Washington, DC:  DOD, 2016):  59–60, 63–64, 82; http://www.defense.gov/ 
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf; 
(Accessed May 17, 2016). 
     77. See Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific:  
China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security, 38 
(4)(Spring 2014): 115–149; DOI:10.1162/ISEC_a_00160; and Andrew F. Krepi- 
nevich. “How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense,” Foreign Affairs, 
94 (2)(March–April 2015): 78–86. 
     78. Krepinevich.  
     79. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, and Mark Cancian, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 
2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships: An Independent Review of U.S. 
Defense Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2016): VIII–IX;  
http://csis.org/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.p
df; (Accessed May 11, 2016). 
     80. Ibid., VIII. 
     81. See Robert S. Ross, “China: American Public Diplomacy and U.S.–China 
Relations, 1949–2012,” in Isolate or Engage: Adversarial States, U.S. Foreign Policy 
and Public Diplomacy, Geoffrey Wiseman, ed., (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2015): 59–84; Lee Kuan Yew, The Grand Masters Insights on China, the 
United States and the World, Interviews and Selections by Graham Allison, Robert 
B. Blackwill, and Ali Wynne, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013): 37–49; and Greg 
Simons, “Taking the New Public Diplomacy Online: Russia and China,” Place 
Branding and Public Diplomacy,  11 (2)(2015):  111–124; doi:10.1057/pb.2014.22.  
     82. Graham Allison, Thucydides Trap Case File, (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affairs, 2016); http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ 
publication/25760/thucydides_trap_project.html; (Accessed May 12, 2016). The 
Thucydides Trap originates in Thucydides Peloponnesian war history in which he 
 54 
states: “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that instilled in Sparta that made war 
inevitable.” Thucydides Peloponnesian War, Richard Crawley, trans. (London: J.M. 
Dent & Co., 1903): 1:24; http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101059041069; 
view=1up;seq=11.; (Accessed May 12, 2016).  
     83. See Colin Dueck, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Robert G. Kaufman, Dangerous 
Doctrine: How Obama’s Grand Strategy Weakened America, (Lexington: Univer- 
sity Press of Kentucky, 2016). 
     84. See Gerald Curtis, “Japan: Stepping Forward but Not Stepping Out,” Regional 
Security Outlook 2015, 19–23; http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CRSO/CSCAP 
CRSO2015.pdf#page=21; (Accessed May 12, 2016); Defense of Japan 2015, 033-
056; NIDS China Security Report 2016: The Expanding Scope of PLA Activities and 
the PLA Strategy, (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, 2016):  
http://www.nids.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2016_A0
1.pdf; (Accessed May 13, 2016). 
     85. See Xiaoming Zhang, “China’s Perceptions of and Responses to Abe’s 
Foreign Policy,” Asian Perspective, 39 (3)(July–September 2015): 423–435; Hiroshi 
Nakashi, “Reorienting Japan: Security Transformation under the Second Abe 
Cabinet,” Asian Perspectives, 39 (3)(July–September 2015):  405–421; and M. Erika 
Pollmann & Alan Tidwell, “Australia’s Submarine Technology Cooperation With 
Japan as Burden-Sharing with the USA in the Asia-Pacific,” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 69 (4)(2015): 394–413; DOI:10.1080/10357718.2015.1034088. 
     86. U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade: Trade Highlights, (Washington, DC:  
Census Bureau, 2016): 1; https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/ 
index.html; (Accessed May 17, 2016)  
     87. See Yinan He, ”Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, 
Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950–2006,” History & Memory, 19 
(2)(Fall/Winter 2007): 43–74; DOI:10.1353/ham.2007.0717; Evan S. Medeiros, 
China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification, (Santa 
Monica: Rand Corporation, 2009): 10–11; http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/ 
MG850.html; (Accessed May 17, 2016); Zheng Wang, Never Forget National 
Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2012); and Masafumi Iida, “Conclusions,” in 
NIDS China Security Report 2016: The Expanding Scope of PLA Activities and the 
PLA Strategy, (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, 2016): 65–69. 
     88. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Anatol Rapoport, ed., (London: Penguin 
Books, 1981): 101; and Henry R. Nau, Conservative Internationalism: Armed 
Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
